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I. Introduction 
The bankruptcy of the Penn Central along with several small railroads 
in the same region initially focused attention on the problems of railroad 
transportation in the Northeast. However, subsequent events, including the 
severe difficulties facing such major railroads as the Rock Island Line and 
the Milwaukee Road, have clearly indicated that the rail transportation 
problem is much more widespread. In fact, a recent study for the U. s. De-
partment of Transportation (August, 1977) argues that about 20 percent of 
the existing U. S. rail system appears to be uneconomic and that the percent-
age for the West North Central region is higher than for the Northeast, while 
the Mountain, Pacific, and West South Central are almost as high. It has 
been argued that a substantial portion of these uneconomic lines must be 
abandoned in order to eliminate the continuing losses on such lines and to 
create a system of financially viable rail carriers. However, shippers and 
other interested parties have argued that abandoning such lines would sub-
stantially increase transportation costs and could severely damage economic 
conditions in areas affected by loss of rail service. 
The purpose of the present study is to analyze the impact of abandonment 
on shipping costs in comparison with the subsidies required to keep these lines 
in operation and, based on the results of this analysis, to examine the out-
comes of abandonment policy, namely, which lines have been abandoned and on 
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which sLrvice has continued und~r subsidy. The study focuses on Ohio because 
Ohio is an important railroad state in the Northeast where the abandonment 
issue had to be faced earlier and under more critical conditions than in other 
regions. As recently as 1975 Ohio had approximately 7,500 miles of railroad 
track, of which about 4,000 miles was owned by solvent private carriers and 
somewhat more than 2,300 was designated to be operated by the Consolidated Rail 
Corporation (Conrail). This left the future of the remaining 1,200 miles of 
primarily light density lines considerably in doubt. It was anticipated, more-
over, that portions of the 6,300 miles of track to be operated by Conrail and 
the solvent private carriers would soon be considered for additional abandon-
ments. Ohio is also of particular interest because the Ohio Con$tit~tiou, unlike 
the con&titutions of most other states, prohibits the use of state tax revenues 
1/ to subs1dize private enterprises such as rail carriers or shippers.- This 
study is limited to grain transportation in 31 counties of central and western 
Ohio because most of the Ohio rail lines potentially subject to abandonment 
are located in this area and because grain transportation is the most impor-
tant activity on most of these light density lines. 
Th~ economic viability of light density lines is analyzed in a frame-
work which assumes that several important variables are fixed because their 
consideration is beyond the scope of this study. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) regulates the rates for all rail carriers, and 4eregulation 
could lead to a significantly different rate structure which might affect the 
viability of some light density lines. The abandonment issue is, however, 
liThe Constitution of the State of Ohio (Article VIII, Section 4) pro-
hibits the state from subsidizing private firms. Efforts have been made to 
change this provision as an amendment was proposed to permit such subsidies, 
but this amendment was defeated in the general election of November 4, 1975, 
by almost 2 to 1. 
- 3 -
doalyzed with the rate structure as currently given. The U. S. Department 
of Transportation (January, 1977, p. 25) indicated in a recent study that 
The essential ingredients of a line specific viability 
test are: (1) accurate segment data, and (2) accurate 
revenue and cost itemization. However, available rev-
enue and costing methodologies are totally inadequate .•.. 
For the most part, the railroads themselves have no 
specific measures of the economic viability of their 
own line segments, except when branch lines are studied 
for possible abandonments. 
Although the issues of cost allocation among rail lines and revenue divi-
sian among rail carriers underlie abandonment decisions, they are also taken 
2/ 
as given for the present study.- In addition, the pricing of services for 
alternative transport modes such as truck or barge is taken as given without 
investigating the possible subsidies that may exist for these modes.l/ 
The second section of this paper describes the two Congressional acts 
which followed the bankruptcy of the Penn Central and provided the legal and 
financial framework for the reorganization of the rail system in the Northeast 
and, in particular, established the categories and procedures to deal with 
applications for rail line abandonment. The third section presents the model 
used to estimate the additional costs of grain transportation resulting from 
the abandonment of 17 light density lines in 31 counties of central and western 
Ohio. The fourth section discusses the outcome of the policies with respect to 
the abandonment or subsidy of these light density lines, that is, which lines 
had been abandoned as of the summer of 1979 and which were continuing to operate 
under subsidy. The final section summarizes the main results of the study and 
1/For examples of some of the difficulties involved in estimating rail-
r~ad freight costs, see Griliches and Harris. 
1/For example, the U.S. Department of Transportation (1978, pp. 106-107) 
estimates that a five axle diesel powered tractor-trai~~r with a gross weight 
of more than 60,000 pounds imposes a cost on t~e hi~hway system qf ~e9{1y twice 
the amount paid in federal user charges. 
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discusses the implications of tht!se results for rail abandonment at the na-
tional level and, in particular, the need for further detailed studies of rail 
abandonment ln other regions. 
I I. Legislative His tory and Abandonment Procedures 
The bankruptcy of the Penn Central in 1970, along with several small-
er railroads in the Northeast region, led to considerable debate over 
the crisis in U. S. rail transportation. One result of this debate was 
the passage by Congress of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 
(3 R Act) which contains several provisions for reorganizing the rail-
roads in a 17 state area of the Northeast. In particular, the 3 R Act 
created the U. S. Railway Association (U.S.R.A.), a non-profi.t 
government planning organization, which was given the responsibility of 
planning a restructuring of the railroads in the area and the authority 
to guarantee loans for that purpose up to $1.5 billion. The U.S.R.A. 
issued its "Preliminary System Plan" in February, 1975, and its "Final 
System Plan" in July, 1975, which outlines the new structure and the 
legal and financial conditions for r£!organization. Other important feat-
ures of the 3 R Act are: (1) the creation of Conrail, a privately man-
aged for profit organization, to operate the new rail network which was 
to survive the restructuring of the bankrupt lines; (2) grants of approxi-
mately $558 million to the bankrupt railroads to keep them operating during 
the restructuring; (3) protectlon from job loss for the railroad employees 
affected by the reorganization; and (4), most important for the present paper, 
subsidization (along with the affected states) of light density lines not in-
cluded in the Final System Plan.i/ 
4/ 
- Light density lines are defined in the Final System Plan as those with an 
annual traffic density of less than 5 million gross ton-miles 
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The Final System Plan becdme effective on April 1, 1976, after 
Congress passed the Rail Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 
(4 R Act) to provide the necessary funding. Besides funding Conrail, the 
4 R Act expands the scope from the initial 17 states to the entire country 
and provides for additional financial assistance to the railroad industry, 
including $360 million over a five year period to subsidize the operation 
of uneconomic light density lines. This subsidy is to be paid partly by 
non-Federal sources, with the Federal share declining from 100 percent in 
the first year to 70 percent in the fifth year.l/ Criteria were also 
established by which rail lines would be judged as financially 
viable or potentially excess. Using those criteria, Conrail took over 
approximately 17,000 miles of rail lines, while approximately 6,000 miles 
of light density lines were designated as potentially excess and excluded 
from Conrail. Light density lines designated as potentially excess are 
to be abandoned unless subsidized, primarily with Federal monies, under 
the terms of the 4 R Act. To qualify for rail service continuation sub-
sidies, each state must develop a rail plan and designate a state agency 
(e.g. the Ohio Rail Transportation Authority) to implement the plan. 
The 4 R Act amended the Interstate Commerce Act to provide for advance 
notice of potential abandonments and to facilita:te offers of financial 
assistance to continue service on rail lines that would otherwise be aban-
doned. Under the amendment, the ICC issued new regulations which require 
1/The non-Federal share may be paid by state governments, local govern-
ments or other interested parties such as shippers. Under the 4 R Act the 
Federal share was to decline to 70 percent on April 1, 1979, but the Local 
Rail Services Assistance Act of 1978 continued the Federal share,at 80 per-
cent until June 30, 1980, and extended the expiration of the progra~ until 
June 30, 1981. 
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each rail carrier to identify on a system map all the rall lines that it 
operates. On this map the following five categories of lines must be 
identified: Category 1, lines which the rail carrier will seek to abandon 
within three years; Category 2, lines under study by the carrier for poss-
ible future abandonment; Category 3, lines for which an abandonment appli-
cation is pending before th~ ICC; Category 4, lines which are currently 
operating under rail service continuation subsidies; and Category 5, all 
other lines owned or operated by the rail carrier.~/ 
If a rail carrier wishes to abandon a line, it must follow certain 
procedures set forth by the ICC. An uneconomic rail line will frequen~ly, 
but not necessarily, first be identified in Category 2 before it shifts 
to Category 1. Any line that a carrier wishes to abandon must be identi-
fied in Cateogry 1 for at least four months before it can move to Cate-
gory 3 with the filing of the abandonment application. After this period 
the carrier next files a Notice of Intent which announces the railroad's 
intention to discontinue service on the line. Within 30 days after the 
Notice of Intent is posted, the abandonment application must be filed, 
and interested parties have a maximum of 35 days after this filing to sub-
mit comments to the ICC. If no significant prote&ts are received from 
interested parties, the ICC will issue an initial decision permitting 
abandonment to become effective 60 days after the application was filed 
by the carrier. 
If significant protests are received from interested parties, the 
ICC shallcomplete a formal investigation within one year. After complet-
]/See Table 2 below for the mileage within Ohio in the different cate-
gories as of August 1, 1978. 
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ing the formal investigation, the lCC will either deny the railroad's 
abandonmt!nt application or issue an initial decision permitting abandon-
ment. Interested parties have a maximum of 20 days to appeal an initial 
decision which gives notice that, unless a purchase or subsidy offer is 
made, a final authorization permitting abandonment will be granted. If 
a subsidy offer is made, the abandonment decision will be postponed for 
up to six months to give the rail carrier and the interested parties time 
to negotiate a subsidy agreement. If no agreement is signed within six 
months, the ICC shall issue a final certificate authorizing abandonment. 
If an agreement involving a subsidy to continue service is reached, ~he 
line will then appear in Category 4 on the system map. 
III. A Model to Estimate the Costs of Rail Abandonment 
The following section estimatE·s the additional transportation costs 
facing grain shippers in a 31 county area of central and western Ohio aa 
a result of the abandonment of 17 Jight density lines. Several different 
analytical methods have been used to study grain transportation in recent 
years, but the most popular technique has been some type of linear pro-
gramming model (see, for example, Ladd and Lifferth or Tyrchniewicz and 
Tosterud). However, linear programming techniques can be computationally 
too costly to handle the large models which are often encountered in trans-
portation problems. Network analysis, on the other hand, yields the same 
optimal solution but can handle significantly more variables and constraints 
at much lower computational cost than linear programming or other optimiza-
tion techniques.l/ Consequently, the network technique is used in the present 
l/see Bradley for an expo~ition of the advaptages of the network tech-
nique. Although few studies have applied.this technique to agricultural trans-
portation problems, Puller, Randolph and Klingman have recently used network 
analysis to study the location of agricultural processing plants. 
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study to formulate the grain transportation problem as a constrained network 
flow which is solved by the Out-of-Kilter Algorithm (see Durbin or Ford and 
Fulkerson). The objective is to estimate a set of flows through the arcs that 
minimizes total costs of grain transportation and handling and simultaneously 
satisfies all demands without violating the capacity limitations of the net-
work. 
In the present study a multi-period transhipment model is developed, 
the solution of which minimizes the total cost of grain transportation and 
handling from farm origins in a 31 county area of central and western Ohio 
to final destinations. The major activities in the model are farm storage 
and drying, elevator storage and drying, elevator receiving and load-out, 
and transportation by truck, rail and barge. Rail shipping activities are 
subdivided into the single car, multi-car and unit train options which ele-
vators have available in Ohio. Farm supplies and final demands for grain 
are assumed to be fixed and not responsive to changes in costs of trans-
portation and handling.~/ To coincide with grain harvesting and shipping 
patterns, the network is divided into three time periods: (1) June through 
August, the wheat harvest and marketlng period; (2) September through 
December, the corn and soybean harvest and the marketing period prior to 
the closing of the Great Lakes for shipping; and (3) January through May, 
the balance of the marketing year. Storage activities and storage costs 
8/ 
- Corn, soybean and wheat produetion for each county was obtained from 
Ohio Agricultural Statistics, 1975. Assuming that corn, but not wheat or 
soybeans, was fed to livestock in the study area in 1975, the transportable 
surplus of grain for each county was defined as soybean and wheat production 
plus corn production adjusted for feed use. Feed use in each county was 
estimated from the numbers of each of six classes of livestock multiplied 
by corn consumption rates for each class. 
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~onnect one time period to the next, so that graih can be transferred over 
time as well as space.l/ 
To analyze the impact of rail abandonment, county grain elevators 
have been classified according to the mode of transportation used: (1) 
elevators using truck transport only; (2) elevators using truck and rail 
service and not exposed to rail abandonment; and (3) elevators using 
truck and rail service and located on a light density line which may be 
abandoned. A farm storage activity is also included to assess possible 
10/ 
changes in on-farm storage due to rail abandonment.-- In addition, the 
network permits intra-county transfer of grain among elevators, so that 
elevators losing rail service can tranship grain to other nearby eleva-
tors. From county elevators grain may be shipped by truck or rail either 
directly to final destin~tions or to inland or river terminals which then 
ship to final destinations. These final destinations include grain pro-
cessors, Great Lakes terminals, East Coast terminals, Gulf Coast termi-
nals, and domestic destinations within Ohio and the rest of the U. S .. ll/ 
As indicated in the introduction, rates for rail shipping activities 
are set by the ICC, and these rates depend on a multiplicity of factors 
including the commodity shipped, the mileage covered and the size of the 
shipment. These rates are, as indicated, a crucial consideration in aban-
donment, as well as an integral part of the calculation of the change in 
lfoperating costs for grain handling and storage in commercial eleva-
tors were obtained from the U.S.D.A., Economic Research Service. 
lO/County farm storage capacity and cost data were estimated from~ 
study by Smith and Baldwin for a 20,000 bushel bin dryer system. 
1!/see Kane for a more detailed discussion of the model. 
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grJin transportation costs due to abandonment. One particularly impor-
tant aspect is the different rate structures facing different grain ele-
vators depending on the size of shipments: some elevators have unit train 
rates as well as multi-car rates for shipments of three to ten cars, while 
12/ 
others have only single car or multi-car rates up to ten cars.-- Unlike 
rail rates, truck rates for unprocessed agricultural products are unregu-
lated, so that these costs in the model are calculated on the basis of 
the commercial rate structure and vary by mileage increments (see Kane, 
pp. 68-69). 
To obtain the necessary data on grain market structure and flows for 
the crop year 1975-76, interviews with a stratified random sample of 58 
grain elevators in 31 counties of central and western Ohio were ~arried 
out during the summer of 1976. Information was collected on elevator 
size, use of different transport modes, location on rail lines, and grain 
flows over space and time. As shown in Table 1, there were 17 rail lines 
with a total of 344.7 miles of track subject to abandonment in this 31 
county area. These 17 rail lin~s varied in length from 3 to 50 miles 
and had 18 elevators along their routes. 
Rail line abandonment is simulated by setting the upper limit on rail 
load-out activities equal to zero for the 18 elevators which are located 
on rail lines subject to abandonment. The cost-minimizing solution to 
the model with rail shipments restricted to zero from these elevators can 
then be compared to the cost-minimizing base solution in which no such 
restrictions are imposed. Total transportation costs in the base solu-
tion are $71.3 million for the system to handle more than 297 million 
12/Railroad rates for single car, three. five and ten multi-car, and 
60 and 100 car unit trains were obtained from Free et al. 
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Table 1: Railroad Lines in Central and Western Ohio Abandoned, Sold or 
Subsidized as of July, 1979 
USRA Total 
Name of Line Line No. Miles 
St. Marys-Bellefontaine 502/3/4/ 38.8 
Richwood-Urbana 1264 32.7 
Bremen-Washington C.H. 496/496a/497 67.8 
Troy-Arcanum 551 23.5 
Howard-Holmesville 478 35.3 
Yellow Springs-Springfield 536/37 11.8 
Hempstead-Lytle 527/28 9.0 
Spring Va1ley-Roxanna 516 5.6 
Marion-Richwood 1263 14.3 
Lebanon-Hageman 525 5.6 
Lima-Wren 1261 50.0 
Van Wert-Ohio City 553 5 
Ohio City-Rockford 534 7.2 
Rockford-Celina 534 10.5 
Celina-St. Henry 534a 9.9 
St. Henry-Ansonia 535 14.2 
Valley Junction-Harrison 57la 3.5 
Total 344.7 
Aban-
doned 
37.1 
29.7 
65.2 
18.9 
35.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
10.5 
0 
14.2 
0 
215.9 
Sold 
0 
3.0 
2.6 
4.6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10.2 
Subsi-
dized 
1.7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11.8 
9.0 
5.6 
14.3 
5.6 
50.0 
0 
7.2 
0 
9.9 
0 
3.5 
118.6 
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bushels of graiu. The mo:st important result in the abandonment solution 
is that trJnsportation costs Lor the system increase by only $253,197 (0.35 
percent). Tiais amount is far less than the nearly $4 million in subsidies 
which the Ohio Department of Transportation Branch Line Plan (pp. 43-240) 
estimated would have been needed in 1976 to upgrade and continue service 
on the 17 light density lines in the study area which are subject to aban-
donment. In the abandonment solution the total volume of grain shipped 
by rail from all elevators continues to be almost twice as great as the 
volume shipped by truck, just as in the base solution. Noreover, in the 
abandonment solution there are no intra-county shipments of grain from eleva-
tors losing rail service to those retaining service, again replicating the 
results of the base solution. 
In spite of the absence of significant changes in the aggregate in mov-
ing from the base solution to the abandonment solution, there are some sub-
stantial differences between the two solutions, especially for the different 
categories of grain elevators. In the base solution the elevators potentially 
losing rail service ship predominantly by rail, and these shipments are, of 
13/ 
course, eliminated in the abandonment solution.-- However, a portion of this 
lost activity is regained in shifts away from elevators which have only truck 
service available. In the abandonment solution the elevators losing rail 
service compete more strongly with the truck-only elevators for the intra-
state grain shipments which move mainly by truck and are eliminated from the 
111rn the interviews carried out in 1979, many of the elevators located 
on lines subject to abandonment stated that they made little use of rail ser-
vice, even when the base solution indicated that rail was the least cost alter-
native. Apparently some grain elevators have found rail service more costly 
than indicated because of its poor quality, which suggests that the increment 
in shipping costs in moving from the base solution to the abandonment solution 
may be overstated. 
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intt!r-sLtte grain market which is almost exclusively served by rail. Grain 
elevators with rail service not subject to abandonment, especially those with 
multi-car capabilitit!s, experience a significant increase in shipping activity 
under the abandonment solution. There are also related shifts in storage away 
from truck-only elevators and elevators losing rail service under abandonment 
to elevators with continuing rail service and especially to on-farm storage. 
It should be noted that the model does not have an investment activity 
and hence does not allow for increases in capacity which might well be sig-
nificant for elevators experiencing an increase in shipping and storage. To 
the extent that capacity constraints are important, such investments might 
be expected to reduce the increase in transportation costs which occur under 
the abandonment solution. On the other hand, elevators losing business might 
cease to operate if they cannot cover costs and earn an adequate profit in 
the long run. The model also does not include transportation activities by 
farmers, and these might be expected to increase under the abandonment solu-
tion as some farmers haul their grain longer distances to elevators with con-
tinuing rail service. Such a change might imply greater maintenance expendi-
tures on rural roads not designed to carry an increased volume of heavy ship-
ments of grain. 
IV. Subsequent Survey of Lines Subject to Abandonment 
A survey of the individual light density lines potentially subject to 
abandonment which was carried out during the summer of 1979 revealed that not 
all of these lines had been abandoned (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The out-
come of subsidy policies some three years after the initial analysis of the 
costs and benefits of abandonment shows that 8 of the 17 lines covering 63 
percent of the mileage in question have been abandoned, while 9 of the 17 
Figure 1: 
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lines covering 34 percent of the mileage are operating under rail service 
continuation subsidies, and the remal.ning 3 percent of the mileage has been 
sold. Of the lines operating under subsidy, most are operated by Conrail 
but three are operated by short line railroads. 141 
The abandoned lines represent those lines excluded from Conrail which 
were available for subsidy under the Final System Plan, but for which no 
operating subsidy agreement was reached between the shippers and the carrier. 
The first four lines listed in Table 1 were abandoned, except for small seg-
ments of each line, early in the subsidy program because shippers showed only 
limited interest in subsidizing the entire length of these relatively long 
15/ lines.- On two of the lines grain shippers showed no interest in partici-
pating in a subsidy agreement, but on one of these lines a grain shipper 
stated that the loss of rail service and the resulting increase in transpor-
tation costs with trucking made him less competitive so that he lost volume 
and needed a wider margin to cover the added cost of operation. On another 
abandoned line a grain shipper continues to use rail service by trucking to 
a nearby solvent carrier, which adds to his cost but is nonetheless cheaper 
than shipping entirely by truck. The fifth line in Table 1, the Howard-
Holmesville line, operated under a subsidy agreement until the line was re-
cently abandoned. Grain shippers on this line stated that they participated 
in a subsidy agreement for about two years, but during the second year firms 
began to drop put of the agreement so that it became too expensive for the 
remaining firms to pay the growing share of the subsidy. 
14/ 
-- A short line railroad is a separate transportation company owning and 
coordinating freight service over a limited expanse of track and connecting 
with one or more larger railroad systems. 
IS/Three small segments were sold to solvent private carriers or to ship-
pers, and the smallest segment was subsidized by two industrial shippers and 
is now conside~ed to be financially viable. 
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Shippers on the abandoned lines frequently complained that the quality 
of Ldl servic'~ had been deteriorating for some time prior to abandonment, 
und this greatly lessened their interest in participating in any subsidy 
agreen1ent. The railroads had incurred large operating deficits on most of 
these lines for many years prior to abandonment. As common carriers, the 
railroads are obligated to continue all authorized service until complete 
withdrawal is permitted by the relevant agency, the ICC in the case of rail-
roads. Since annual maintenance rosts for light density lines typically 
range from $2,500 to over $3,000 per mile, railroads were able to reduce 
substantially their expenditures, and hence reduce their deficits, by defer-
ring maintenance on these lines. Shippers in central and western Ohio, 
already frustrated by rail car shortages, cars in poor condition or lost in 
shipment, and infrequent service were also affected by the undependable ser-
vice resulting from deferred maintenance and thus began to seek alternative 
modes of transportation, usually trucking. Although published rates may make 
rail service appear cheaper than trucking, the poor quality of service on 
some lines before abandonment has often made overall costs lower for trans-
portation by truck. 
The next five rail lines listed in Table 1 are operated by Conrail under 
rail service continuation subsidies.li/ The Yellow Springs-Springfield, the 
Hempstead-Lytle and the Spring Valley-Roxanna lines all are subsidized under 
agreements involving only industrial shippers. The grain shippers located 
on these lines complained about the poor quality of rail service and stated 
that they therefore preferred to ship by truck. However, it should be pointed 
16/ 
-- It is interesting to note that the subsidized rail lines listed in 
Table 1 are quite short relative to the abandoned lines. This is consistent 
with Due's analysis of the factors affecting the survival of light density lines. 
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out that failure to enter a subsidy agreement would not prevent them from 
using the subsidized rail service. The other two of these five lines are 
operated under subsidy agreements which include both grain shippers and indus-
trial shippers. One grain shipper on the Marion-Richwood line pays a portion 
of the rail subsidy even though he currently ships only by truck because he 
wishes to retain the option of rail service. Other grain shippers argued 
that this line could be made viable if rail service were improved and especially 
if more covered hopper cars were available so that traffic on the line could 
be increased. Grain shippers on the Lebanon-Hageman line expressed concern 
about the future viability of this line because trucking would be cheaper than 
shipping by rail if the amount of the subsidy which they have to pay increases 
significantly in the future. 
Two aspects of rail service continuation subsidies mentioned earlier should 
be emphasized at this point: (1) the non-Federal share of the subsidy is cur-
rently 20 percent but is scheduled to increase to 30 percent in mid 1980; and 
(2) the amount of the subsidy is basea on estimates of revenues and costs which 
are subject to considerable controversy. In order to compute the deficit to be 
covered by the subsidy, a line segment is allocated the revenues accruing to 
Conrail from all freight originated or terminated on that line and is charged 
all the avoidable costs of operation on that line segment plus all the avoid-
able off-branch costs of moving the freight. These cost estimates are based 
on syste~wide averages for freight shipments which may not be an accurate 
measure of the costs of moving freight over a particular portion of the system 
Three short line railroads which operate under rail service continuation 
subsidies were created from the last seven lines listed in Table 1. The 
Spencerville and Elgin, which runs from Lima to Wren with a spur from Ohio 
City to Rockford, is owned by four grain and fertilizer firms which fe~t 
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threatened by the loss of rail service and hence integrated into the trans-
17/ portation business.-- These firms share equally the cost of the non-Federal 
portion of the subsidy, but some non-subsidy-paying shippers also use this 
rail service. The Western Ohio railroad which operates the Celina-St. Henry 
line is owned by an individual who is not a shipper and who may derive signifi-
18/ 
cant non-pecuniary benefits from operating a railroad under government subsidy.---
Of the seven shippers paying the non-Federal portion of the subsidy on this line, 
none is an important grain shipper. The Valley Junction-Harrison line forms 
the Ohio portion of the Indiana and Ohio short line railroad. This portion 
has been profitable because of the revenues generated by two large lumber and 
building supply firms and one grain elevator. However, the Indiana portion 
requires large subsidies, with the non-Federal share being paid by the state 
of Indiana rather than by private shippers. 
The determination of revenues and costs in order to arrive at the amount 
of the subsidy for a short line railroad is significantly different from that 
for the light density lines operated by Conrail under rail service continua-
tion subsidies. The revenue earned by a short line is negotiated with the 
connecting carrier as a share of the total revenue accruing to the connecting 
carrier for moving freight ori.ginating or terminating on the short line. This 
share is based in general on the length of haul on the short line and on the 
connecting carrier but may differ according to the specific agreement which 
the short line negotiates with the connecting carrier. The short line rail-
road is responsible for all operating and maintenance costs on the lines which 
11/The Van Wert-Ohio City line was abandoned when this short line was 
formed. 
lS/The Rockford-Celina and St. Henry-Ansonia lines were abandoned when 
this short line was formed. 
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lt led&es, but nut for off-branch cost&. Both for short line railroads and 
for light density lines operated by Conrail, lease costs are a major portion 
of total costs. 191 The ]ease cost is based on the net liquidation value of 
the line, estimated from Rail Services Planning Office standards, multiplied 
by the interest rate on short-term U.S. Treasury notes. Due to increasing 
interest rates and the increasing value of scrap steel and land, lease costs 
have increased rapidly from an average of $2,475 per mile in 1977-78 to an 
estimated $6,931 in 1979-80. Shippers and the Ohio Rail Transportation 
Authority have often complained about this rapid increase in lease costs, and 
in some cases a reduction has been negotiated. 
V. Conclusions 
The main conclusion of the present study is that the abandonment of 17 
light density rail lines in central and western Ohio would have very little 
impact on grain transportation costs. When the abandonment solution is com-
pared to the base solution of the network model, grain transportation costs 
increase by only $253,197, which is less than one-half of 1 percent of the 
total cost of moving grain produced in the 31 county area under study. This 
contrasts with the nearly $4 million in subsidies which the Ohio Department of 
Transportation Branch Line Plan estimated would have been needed in 1976 to 
upgrade and continue service on these 17 light density lines. To the extent 
that individual grain shippers are required to pay the costs of maintaining 
service on light density lines, it would be expected that most of the 17 light 
density lines would be abandoned. In spite of the very small increase in 
19/The short line railroads lease from the bankrupt Penn Central or Erie 
Lackawanna, while the lease costs for the light density lines operated by 
~onrail are imputed for the purpose of calculating the amount of the subsidy. 
- 20 -
aggregate grain transportation costs due to abandonment, the network model 
reveals a significant impact on specific grain elevators and shippers, and 
some of these individuals might be willing to pay substantial amounts to 
maintain rail service. 
A survey of the 17 light density lines subject to abandonment carried 
out in the summer of 1979 revealed that about half of the lines covering 
more than 60 percent of the mileage in question had been abandoned. A key 
factor in the abandonment of many light density lines has been the deteriora-
tion of service due to deferred maintenance - a policy which allowed the rail-
roads to reduce their losses on the lines on which they had been required to con-
tinue service. Some grain shippers stated that due to the poor quality of 
rail service they had already switched to trucking before abandonment, even 
though the published rates used in the network model indicated that rail ser-
vice should be lower cost. Another important factor in abandonment appears 
to be the length of the line. Shorter lines, and small segments of some 
longer lines, have tended to remain in service, while most of the longer lines 
have been abandoned. Finally, the survey encountered few, if any, examples of 
"captive" shippers, as few firms stated that they would incur a substantial 
increase in transportation costs due to abandonment. In addition, almost all 
lines operating under subsidy were subsidized by more than two shippers, and 
these groups generally indicated that they were unwilling to pay appreciably 
greater subsidies because of the availability of alternative modes of trans-
portation. 
The Ohio Constitution requires that shippers, rather than the state, pay 
the non-Federal share of the rail service continuation subsidies, and this 
may have been an important factor contributing to the abandonment of non-eco-
nomic rail lines in Ohio. Table 2 compares the rail mileage in Ohio in the 
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Table 2: Rail Mileage by ICC Categories in State Rail Plans 
for Ohio and Indiana as of August, 1978 
ICC Categories Ohio Indiana 
Total Rail Mileage 6,700 6,405 
Category I: anticipated to be 138.8 209.5 
abandoned in three years. 
Category II: under study for 154 270.9 
potential abandonment. 
Category III: pending abandonment. 185.8 133.5 
Category IV. operating under subsidy. 160 382.0 
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different ICC categories with the mileage in Indiana, a state where tax 
mDnies can be used to pay the non-Federal share of the subsidy. Total mile-
age for the two states is nearly equ1l, but Indiana has more than twice as 
many miles operating under subsidy as Ohio. Moreover, Ohio has more miles 
pending abandonment, while Indiana h.1s more miles in Categories I and II 
which seem more likely to end up operating under subsidy in the case of 
Indiana. The question of who pays tl1e non-Federal share of rail service con-
tinuation subsidies and the impact on abandonment decisions is clearly an 
important issue for further study in other states. 
Extrapolating the results for Ohio to the national level requires not 
only studies of subsidy policies such as those just suggested, but also studies 
for other regions and other products of additional transportation costs result-
ing from abandonment. Ladd and Liffarth have examined a multi-county area in 
Iowa and Tyrchniewicz and Tosterud a part of Southwestern Manitoba, and in both 
cases the added costs due to abandonment were found to be quite small. However, 
these studies are limited to grain transportation and to areas not markedly 
dissimilar to central and western Ohio. Moreover, as mentioned in the intro-
duction and elsewhere in the present paper, railroad abandonment is signifi-
cantly influenced by the procedures used to allocate costs and to divide 
revenues, by the setting of rates for railroads, and by the implicit subsi-
dies which are alleged to exist for alternative modes of transportation. 
Final conclusions about the advisability of abandonment cannot be reached 
without taking these considerations into account. 
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